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Activos hipotecables y política monetaria
Resumen
Un sistema financiero bien informado y cauteloso puede mejorar el bienestar de una 
economía al canalizar los excedentes de los ahorradores a los prestatarios. Sin embargo, 
en una situación de crisis, el menor precio de bienes hipotecables limita la capacidad de 
crédito de la economía, generando la posibilidad de una reducción en el crédito inclusive 
en un escenario de bajas tasas de interés. Este documento ilustra el punto anteriormente 
mencionado através de un modelo de equilibrio general en el que el uso de activos como 
colateral determina que tan riesgoso es el comportamiento del sistema financiero. Esta y 
varias otras condiciones amplifican la magnitud de un choque de productividad negativo
Palabras clave: política monetaria, crédito, hipotecas, equilibrio general.
Clasificación JEL: E52, E58, G21
Ativos Hipotecáveis e Política Monetária
Resumo
Um sistema financeiro bem informado e cauteloso pode melhorar o bem-estar de uma 
economia ao canalizar os excedentes dos poupadores aos mutuários. No entanto, em uma 
situação de crise, o menor preço de bens hipotecáveis limita a capacidade de crédito da 
economia, gerando a possibilidade de uma redução no crédito inclusive em um cenário de 
baixas taxas de juros. Este documento ilustra o ponto anteriormente mencionado através 
de um modelo de equilíbrio geral no que o uso de ativos como colateral determina que 
tanto risco há no comportamento do sistema financeiro. Esta e várias outras condições 
amplificam a magnitude de um choque de produtividade negativo.
Palavras-chave: política monetária, crédito, hipotecas, equilíbrio geral.
Classificação JEL: E52, E58, G21
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Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis has reinforce the idea that the financial system has a 
considerable impact on the economic cycle and that a strong and sustained 
recovery must on a solid financial system. Nevertheless, recovery has been 
slow and highly expansive fiscal and monetary policies have done little to 
improve this. Credit recovery has become one of the main concerns of po-
liticians, as expressed by the chairman of the Federal Reserve (fed), Ben S. 
Bernanke, in his declaration on June 7, 2012:
The depressed housing market has also been an important drag on 
the recovery. Despite historically low mortgage rates and high levels 
of affordability, many prospective home buyers cannot obtain mort-
gages, as lending standards have tightened and the creditworthiness 
of many potential borrowers has been impaired.
The behavior described in Bernanke’s declaration has no precedent in 
the last two decades, as shown in figure 1. It also summarizes most of the 
purpose of this paper which is to develop a theoretical model that shows 
how changes in collateral constraints caused by both changes in the price 
of collateral and the cautious behavior of the banks can diminish monetary 





























































Household’s debt as % of the income Federal funds rate Prime rate
Figure 1. Household’s Debt as % of the Income and Interest Rates (Monthly)
Collateralized Assets Prices and Monetary Policy
Revista de Economía del Rosario. Vol. 22. No. 2. Julio-Diciembre 2019. 155-185
158
This slump in household credit has been one of the main reasons why 
the economic recovery has been slower than usual —similar references are 
found in Miller and Stiglitz (2010) Diamond and Rajan (2009), Mishkin (2009), 
Taylor (2009), and Brunnermeier (2008)—. As shown in figure 2,1 the US 
unemployment rate has never remained over 7% for very long in the last two 


































































unemployment rate GDP cycle series
Figure 2. US Unemployment and GDP Cycle (Monthly)
Nevertheless, this type of co-movement between the credit and economic 
cycle is far from new. Aliaga-Díaz and Pía (2010) —see also: Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009), Bordo (2008) and Mendoza and Terrones (2008)— have found 
evidence in line with this by proving the counter-cyclical behavior of interest 
rates. This implies that during crisis, credit is less accessible (due to higher 
interest rates), reducing investment and worsening the recession.
The connection between credit and the economic cycle is closely related 
to what is referred to in the literature as the “credit crunch” and “financial 
accelerator”. These two terms are often used to explain the effect of the fi-
nancial system in economic crisis. The credit crunch refers to a significant 
1  GDP cycle is obtained using the Hodrick Prescott filter with λ = 14400.
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reduction in credit supply; the financial accelerator has been explained as the 
amplification of initial shocks due to changes in the credit market.
Bernanke and Lown (1991) mention a set of arguments that could explain 
the credit crunch in the US 1990 crisis. Among the many reasons offered by 
the authors, “overzealous regulation” and “credit demand and borrowers’ 
balance sheets” fit quite well into the events of the last six years —even though 
the authors did not choose the aforesaid as the main factors for the 1990s 
credit crunch—. The former refers to a strict behavior from banks during the 
economic crisis in order to reduce risky credit that could lead to loan losses. 
This kind of behavior directly downsizes credit. The second point argues 
that during crisis, credit demand slows down. One of the many reasons for 
it is the weakening of borrowers’ balance sheets, which is affected by lower 
prices. The latter argument becomes more relevant after the most recent cri-
sis. As shown in figure 3, real house prices have been constantly decreasing 
































































Home Price Indices Household’s debt as % of the income
Figure 3. Case-Shiller Home Price Indices and Household’s Debt as % of the 
Income (Monthly)
As shown by Arango et al. (2011), one of the reasons that could induce an 
economic crisis after the bursting of a price bubble is a protracted underpri-
cing of goods used as collateral, particularly land prices. This phenomenon 
reduces collateral for a long period, increasing the length and seriousness of 
the credit crunch.
Collateralized Assets Prices and Monetary Policy
Revista de Economía del Rosario. Vol. 22. No. 2. Julio-Diciembre 2019. 155-185
160
Using some recent developments from the Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (dsge) literature on the housing market, this paper develops a 
dsge model that explains how a financial system’s collateral constraint can 
amplify negative economic shocks in an expansive monetary environment, 
reducing monetary policy impact on the economic activity.
A word on the limitations of this research is due. This manuscript limits 
its analysis of monetary policy to the use of the interest rate instrument. As 
such no-conventional monetary policy, like the ones observed in the United 
States and Europe in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, are beyond the scope this 
paper and subject matter for further research. In this sense, the effectiveness 
of the monetary policy is defined as the impact of interest rates on economic 
activity, especially on production, since the model presented in this manus-
cript includes prices, along with some rigidities on the price setting process 
(sticky prices), but no shocks on inflation.
1. Credit Crunch and Financial Accelerator
A credit crunch has usually been thought of as a consequence of economic 
downturns instead of a cause of economic fluctuations. One of the conse-
quences of a financial system is the presence of larger fluctuations due to the 
monetary accelerator. The seminal work of Bernanke et al. (1996) refers to two 
complementary characteristics of the financial accelerator: the amplification 
of initial shocks and its propagation. The main reason behind these two con-
sequences is the worsening of the financial conditions of the agent. In parti-
cular, a flight to quality reduces access to the financing of the most vulnerable 
agents in the economy, restraining their capacity to smooth consumption.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) illustrate some of the financial accelerator 
effects by showing how Real Business Cycle (rbc) fluctuations can reduce 
cash flow to borrowers, and later through investment, to the rest of the eco-
nomy, which generates a vicious cycle that amplifies the effect of the initial 
shock and prolongs it to the following periods.
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) reached a similar conclusion using a model 
where companies can only operate with debt. They found that a company 
whose access to financing reduced suffers a decrease in its production and 
profits, which in turn induces a decline in income to the rest of the economy. 
Gertler (1992) and Aghion and Bolton (1997), among other authors, found 
the same effects with different models.
Bernanke et al. (1998) mention information asymmetries to be one of the 
main reasons for the financial accelerator. They also cite agency costs and the 
fact that, under credit market frictions, borrowers’ finance premiums depend 
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inversely on their wealth, reinforcing the conclusion that an exogenous re-
duction of household income restrains access to credit.
In line with Bernanke et al. (1998), Aoki et al. (2004) present a model with 
frictions in the credit market that includes housing services as part of con-
sumption. They found that a positive shock in the economy increases the 
demand for houses and, therefore, house prices rise, which in turn improves 
house owners’ net worth, allowing them to borrow more money, increasing 
the demand for houses even further.
Considering a different perspective, Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) seminal 
paper introduces a collateral constraint for borrowing, describing a different 
crisis propagation mechanism through credit. In this type of model, crisis 
generates a decrease in the price of any goods used as collateral, causing a 
reduction in borrowing capacity; therefore, lower spending.
The Kiyotaki and Moore’s set up has been widely used in more recent 
papers, such as Kocherlakota (2000), Monacelli (2009), Iacoviello (2005), Calza 
et al. (2009), Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski (2011), and Arango et al. (2011), 
among others, due to the recent surge on interest in the relationship between 
credit and the price of goods used as collateral. Most of these papers use New 
Keynesian dsge models that illustrate how the financial system can amplify 
the initial effect of productivity or monetary policy shock. Many of those 
models relay on Calvo (1983) pricing set up in order to simulate the effect of 
the price of durable goods on a collateral constraint.
Most of the literature after Kiyotaki and Moore’s paper has taken colla-
teral constraint as an exogenous term. Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski (2011) 
go further on this, presenting a dsge model that introduces a credit constra-
int that, in an exogenous way, becomes more restrictive and in turn causes 
a credit crunch.
In the same vein of the financial accelerator literature, this paper describes 
a model where financial markets amplify economic shocks. Other important 
studies for the development of this paper are referenced below. Nevertheless, 
the literature on the credit-market is vast, and the review presented here is far 
from being a complete survey. Bernanke et al. (1996; 1998) can be referenced 
for further consultation.
2. The Price Bubble
Wrong pricing is not an idea with which many economists feel comfortable. 
Nevertheless, price bubbles are mostly related to this term. The last us crisis 
was an example of incorrect pricing, as reported in various journals: “We eco-
nomists were wrong: Even when traders in an asset market know the value 
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of the asset, bubbles form dependably. Bubbles can arise when some agents 
buy not on fundamental value, but on price trend or momentum” (Gjerstad 
& Smith, 2009).
Bubbles don’t spring from nowhere. They’re usually tied to a develo-
pment with far-reaching effects: electricity and autos in the 1920s, the 
Internet in the 1990s, the growth of China and India. At the outset, a 
surge in the values of related businesses and goods is often justified. 
But then it detaches from reality (Lahart, 2008).
What this section is trying to say is that a price bubble usually only looks 
like irrational behavior after it bursts. In the meantime, as prices rise and peak, 
it looks like a sustainable situation. In the words of the former chairman of 
the fomc, Alan Greenspan:
this vast increase in the market value of asset claims is in part the in-
direct result of investors accepting lower compensation for risk. Such 
an increase in market value is too often viewed by market participants 
as structural and permanent (Krugman, 2005).
The pricing behavior mentioned above leads to larger consequences that 
extended to the economy as a whole. As stated by some analysts, the bursting 
of the house price bubble plays a crucial role when the economy crashes:
In the absence of home-price appreciation, many households are 
finding it difficult to refinance their way out of adjustable-rate mort-
gages obtained at the height of the housing boom. Larger mortgage 
payments could exacerbate delinquencies and foreclosures, especia-
lly with interest rate resets expected to remain high for the next year 
(DiMartino & Duca, 2007).
Some of this trouble might have been avoided if home prices had 
continued to climb like they did between 2000 and 2005. As a home 
appreciates, even borrowers who aren’t paying the principal loan 
amount build up more equity. That in turn would have made it easier 
for subprime borrowers to refinance into yet another loan with a low 
interest rate (Associated Press, 2007).
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These two statements reflect the main idea of this paper, which focuses 
on the bursting of the price bubble.2
2.1. Financial System’s Cautious Behavior
A financial system will often take many precautions, such as the analysis 
of payment affordability and a credit score, among others. Still, the only 
precaution that remains useful after default is collateral, although the sole 
action of asking for it can be seen as cautious behavior. Under Kiyotaki and 
Moore’s approach, only one percent of the asset is useful as collateral (usually 
75%). This proportion is constant and therefore makes it harder to make the 
financial system tighten its behavior. Since all these situations are examples 
of cautious behavior to one degree or another, in this paper, for simplicity, 
collateral taken at a certain percentage will be as such called.3
This paper presents a model where the collateral constraint, unlike in 
previous literature, is endogenous and describes the financial system’s de-
cisions. This, along with a “naive pricing” scheme, as proposed in Arango 
et al. (2011), generates an amplifying effect like the one described by the fi-
nancial accelerator literature. However, unlike most conventional wisdom, 
the financial accelerator is not driven by the interest rate. As a consequence, 
this paper’s contribution is to simulate a credit crunch in a low-interest rates 
environment so that monetary policy has no significant effect.
After this brief introduction, four more sections complete this paper: 
section two presents the dsge model, section three presents the parameter 
calibration, section four shows the simulation results, and section five draws 
conclusions.
3. The Model
The representative households that use durable and non-durable goods cons-
truct the economy described in the model. They obtain their income from 
several sources dividable into three groups: productive factors, benefits, and 
credits. There are three types of productive factors: labor, capital, and land, 
all used by companies and owned by households. They produce intermediate 
goods that are later used by companies to produce the final goods consumed 
2 A description of the boom and consequent burst in a price bubble can be found in 
Arango et al. (2011).
3 Lower percentages will imply a less lax behavior.
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by the households. The intermediate companies are slightly differentiated 
and produce benefits delivered to the owners.
Credits have to be paid within a certain time after they are acquired, 
with an interest rate set by the monetary authority. In this way, the monetary 
authority provides all the liquidity needed to sustain a Taylor rule based in-
terest rate. Credit is provided through a financial system that works under 
perfect competition, having no markup on the interest rate. Nevertheless, the 
financial system demands collateral for lending, determined by land price, 
which is equivalent to the present value of the future rent of the land. This 
closes the production and credit cycle, summarized in figure 4.
4. Households




Where Nt is the borrowers’ total hours worked and Xt is the consumption 
index, which is a bundle of non-durable (Ct) and durable (dt) consumption, 
described by:
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Figure 4. The Model
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Also, it will be assumed that utility is a constant relative risk aversion 
function described by:








Household’s decisions are subject, at any time, to an inter-temporal budget 
constraint that, expressed in units of the non-durable goods, is:
wtlt + rt
kkt + pt + bt + rt
L L+ (1−δ h)qtdt−1 + (1−δ k )kt−1 ≥ (1+ rt )bt−1 + ct + dtqt + kt (4)
Where at every period t: Wt is the salary; rt
K the capital’s rent, kt the ca-
pital; pt intermediate firms benefits; L  y rt
L the land and it’s rent; bt the debt 
acquired every period; rt the interest rate;
4 δh and δk the durable goods and 
capital’s depreciation rate, and qt durable goods price. Finally, π t
c  is the change 
in the price of the consumption good; given that every variable is expressed 
in terms of the consumption good, π t
c  is the measure of inflation.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), household’s borrowing decision 
is also constrained to its collateral endowment, this is:
bt(1+ rt ) ≤ XtEt(ζ t ) (5)
Where Et(ζt) is the expected value of land and Xt is the proportion of 
land’s value usable as collateral; as in Monacelli (2009), collateral constraint 
saturates in the proximity of the steady state, making equation (5) equality. 
Given that land is a productive factor, its value is determined by the present 
value of future productivity:
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Following closely Arango et al. (2011), land’s value is set on a naive5 way, 
in which lands value depends on the present value of future land’s revenue, 
this is:6




∞∑ rtL L 11− β (7)
Equation (7) assumes that the market sees transitory productivity shocks 
as permanent, which is in line with the behavior described in “The Price 
Bubble” section. Nevertheless, as the shocks disappear, equation (7) implies 
that land prices return to its unchanged steady state.
Household’s decisions on consumption of labor, capital and borrowing are:


















t = λtwt (10)
λt = λtrt
k + λt+1β(1−δ k ) (11)
βλt+1(1+ rt+1) = λt + λtγ t(1+ rt ) (12)
Where λt is the shadow price of real income that, as shown in equation (8), 
is equivalent to the marginal utility of non-durable consumption.
4.1. Final Good Producers
Final good producers transform the intermediate good (yjt) in both durable 
and non-durable goods (yit = ct, dt), using the same technology described by 
the following bounder:
5 The naive pricing scheme proposed by the authors supposes that, at any moment, 
market’s land valuation is done assuming that future land’s revenues would stay unchanged 




+2 = ⋅⋅⋅) as if the present is the steady state.
6 Given that 0 < 𝛽 < 1 expresion β h
h=0
∞∑  is equal to 11− β .
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= yit for i = d,c (13)
Those firms minimize their cost determined by the input price (Pit) sub-











Where Pt is the aggregated price level given by:






4.2. Intermediate Good Firms
A typical firm j operates a Cobb-Douglas production function given by:









 describes the technology process, which depends 
on a normal distributed shock.
Firms minimize their cost subject to their production function, this is:
min
ljt ,kjt
wtlj ,t + rt
kk j ,t + rt





Where ηjt is the intermediate good production’s marginal cost. First order 
conditions attaining capital, land and labor are:
rt
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4.3. Intermediate Goods Pricing
Intermediate goods firms also select their prices following a Calvo pricing 
restriction. This means that, at any period t, only a proportion 1-w of the firms 


























































Equation (22) is the firm’s j relative price that, along with (15), summari-
zes the solution to (21).
4.4. Financial System
A financial system under perfect competition means that no benefit is obtained 
from its activities. Nevertheless, to stay in the market, financial institutions 
must take measures that allow them to have a safe lending activity. It means 
that collateral must be enough to cover the debt at any time, a situation that 
is particularly difficult to attain when collateral prices are in a downward 
dynamic. From now on the condition that enables a complete collateral co-
verage of the debt’s value will be referred to as safe lending condition (slc), 
which implies that at any time:
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(1+ rt )bt−1 ≤ζ t (23)
As said before, this type of condition is overruled by equation (5) during 
positive fluctuations, since lands price will be always larger; hence, enough 
to cover the debt and its cost.
The collateral value can be expressed at any time as a function of its dy-
namics:
ζ t = ktζ (24)
Where
ktε(0,∞) (25)
As mentioned before, a financial system problem arises when land value 








The slc problem is that credit’s approval is given one period before its 
payment, making it impossible to know the collateral coverage over the debt 
if defaulted, when credit conditions are established. In this order, we have 
that if credit is approved in t, slc is:
(Et 1+ rt+1[ ])bt ≤ Et[ζ t+1]
(Et 1+ rt+1[ ])bt ≤ Et[kt+1]ζ
(28)
Assuming one more time naive pricing, this is:
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A similar condition is found in (5), where Xt is readable as a variable that 
undervalues current lands price in order to guarantee the complete coverage 
of debts in the next period. Following this interpretation, slc can be expressed 
as a condition on Xt. Using equation (5) and (29), we have that a sufficient 
condition for slc is:





Following the later and using kt as Xt’s argument, Xt must fit the following 
conditions
xt =
1. f (kt )∈(0,1)∀kt ∈(0,∞)
2. f (kt ) = 0 ⇔ kt = 0







The first condition constrains equation (5) to the literature standards of 
Xt between 0 and 1, given that kt can only take positive values; the second 
one keeps the credit to zero when there is no value in the collateral, and the 
third allows for equation (30) to be met.
















Where ϑ and ϕ are chosen to fit conditions (32) as shown in figure 5.
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Figure 5. Mapping of X(kt)
4.5. Monetary Policy
The monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule determined by the con-


















Where ϑ determines the weight of inflation in the dual objective interest 
rate rule.
5. Calibration
Calibration of the model is done following some literature standards. Most 
of the works used for this are built to replicate the US economy This paper is 
intended to illustrate the transmission mechanism through which the financial 
system can amplify negative economic shocks in a low-interest rates environ-
ment. So as prediction power is not an issue a non-controversial calibration, 
like the one presented in this section, serves well this paper’s purpose.
Among some works, Faia and Monacelli (2007) and Monacelli (2009) 
were closely followed to choose the parameters’ value. Some other papers 
are mentioned in table 1.
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𝛽 0.99 Monacelli (2009); Krusell and Smith (1998); Faia and Monacelli 
(2007), and Galí (2008).
δ 0.025 Monacelli (2009); Campbell and Hercowitz (2006), and Faia and 
Monacelli (2007).
θ 6 Monacelli (2009), and Faia and Monacelli (2007).
αh 0.27 Monacelli (2009), and Carlstom and Fruest (2006).
v 0.16 Kocherlakota (2000).
α 1/3 Faia and Monacelli (2007), and Campbell and Hercowitz (2006).
w 0.75 Faia and Monacelli (2007), and Monacelli (2009).
σ 1.5 Smets and Wouters (2003).
μ 1 Gali (2008) and Walsh (2010).
x 0.75 Monacelli (2009).
φ 0.5 Taylor (1993).
Households discount factor 𝛽 is set equal to 0.99, which means that the 
discount rate is 0.03 in a quarterly basis. Labor and lands share in the pro-
duction function are in that order α = 0.33 and v = 0.16. Capital is ad durable 
goods depreciation factor; δk and δh are both equal to 0.025.
The elasticity of substitution among productive sectors is given by θ = 6. 
The elasticity of substitution between durable and non-durable goods (vc) 
is set to 1.4. Durable goods share in the consumption bounder is αh = 0.27. 
The chance of price adjustment (w = 0.75) implies that it occurs every four 
quarters.7 Consumption and labor weights in the utility function are given by 
α = 1 and μ = 1. Finally, it is assumed that only 75% of the land can be used 
as collateral (X = 0.25).
As mentioned before, ϑ and ϕ are chosen to fit conditions (32) this is 
ϑ= 1.93 and ϕ = 0.87. All other parameters that are taken from the literature 
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5. Results
This section presents the model’s results under two different conditions: fixed 
and variable Xt. The first case describes a collateral constraint very similar 
to the one in Kiyotaki and Moore, where the proportion of lands value as co-
llateral is always constant (I will refer to this case as fixed: bt(1+ rt ) ≤ XEt(ζ t )).
The second case is the one described (5) where a downward trend on 
land’s value increases the financial system’s awareness and so reduces the 
credit slackness, as described by equation (33), reducing households’ access 
to new credits at any interest rate (I will refer to this case as variable).
Figures 6 and 7 show the response of different variables to a shock in 
technology given by a 1% decrease in ε t
z in period t = 0. Figure 6 shows that 
a 1% negative shock in technology caused an even larger reduction in pro-
duction due to the so call financial accelerator, as reflected in the borrowing’s 
dynamics (figure 7).
From a demands point of view, the negative shock reduces land’s produc-
tivity, causing an even larger reduction in its value due to the naive pricing 
assumption, which strongly restrains credit extending the reduction effects 
to durable consumption and capital investment. Particularly, capital shows a 
very pronounced decrease highly linked to the durable goods dynamics that, 
opposite to the non-durable goods, show an increase after the production 
shock. Both capital and non-durable goods are instruments that allow hou-
seholds to transfer wealth from one period to the other. Nevertheless, unlike 
capital behavior, durable goods profitability is never affected by the techno-
logy shock, making households substitute capital with durable goods. From a 
supply point of view, the negative ε t
z shock reduces all productive factors rent, 
shrinking the household’s supply of all of them, especially of capital as said 
before. This reduces production and, therefore, consumption and investment.
As mentioned before, figures 6 and 7 show the effects whit a fixed X and 
variable Xt described in equation (33). Both figures show that slc induces an 
even deeper fluctuation, particularly on the credits’ dynamics. However, the 
production downsize during the first period is only 1.075 times bigger than 
under variable Xt; this difference diminishes during the following periods. 
The fact that this situation is common to all the variables allows concluding 
that most of the financial accelerator effect simulated by the model is explai-
ned by the collateral value and no so much by the financial system’s cautious 
behavior. A similar remark is found in Bernanke et al. (1991), where address 
as “overzealous regulation” has a significant impact on lending. On the other 
hand, borrowers’ balance sheets strongly determined by collateral’s value, is 
found to be a valid answer to the weakening of lending activity.
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Unlike conventional wisdom, in both cases depicted in figures 6 and 7 
production, credit and other variables slowdown despite the low interest 
rates. The main reason for credit and economy’s slowdown is found in the 
limited access to lending at a low interest rate like one set by the monetary 
authority.8 It is the shortage of warranties offered by the borrowers what ex-
plains most of the credit slump.
5.1. Alternative Monetary Policy
Simulations in figures 8 and 9 show the effect of an interest rate rule different 
to (34). This alternative rule uses a bounder of lands prices and the price index 
of consumption goods, this is:



















Where v is the weight of land’s value in the prices index factor.
As shown in figures 6 and 7, land value is one of the variables that have the 
strongest reaction after the initial shock. Using (35) causes a greater decrease 
in interest rates for higher values of v. A harder monetary policy should redu-
ce the economy’s slump, but, as shown in figures 8 and 9, a more restrictive 
credit constraint, explained by the collateral value and the financial system 
behavior,9 can stop its expansion effects. Figures 8 and 9 respectively map the 
impulse response of product and interest for different values of v. Figures 10 
and 11 show that higher values of v increase the monetary authority reaction 
to the production shock, through lower interest rates. This effect is hard to 
acknowledge in figures 8 and 9, which unveils some monetary policy impo-
tence during the economic crisis. It is a consequence of the strong reaction 
on the collateral that prevents credit recovery despite the low-interest rates.
5.2. Alternative Land’s Valuation Scheme
Pricing as proposed in equation (7) creates a strong reaction after a produc-
tivity shock, allowing to encourage the dynamics of a price bubble burst, 
as shown in figures 6 to 11 for the land’s value. Even if the results are quite 
8 A low interest rate rules out a flight to quality or any shortage of financial system’s 
liquidity.
9 Simulations are done using (5).
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compelling, it is interesting to try a different way to determine the land’s 
value in order to prove the exercises robustness.
An alternative pricing scheme must be based on a different expectations 
formation model; one alternative is adaptive expectations. Following Nerlove 
and Bessler (2001) one can suppose that at every time t the expected land’s 
revenue is the steady state value plus a portion of the deviation from the one 
observed in the last period, this is:
Et rt+1
L( ) =r−L +Ω rtL −r−L( ) for 0 <Ω < 1 (36)
Iterating and replacing (36) in (6), follows that:



















As the reader can notice, equation (7) and (37) are similar in the fact that 
both depend on the present productivity of land; the difference is that (37) 
assumes that only a fraction of the present productivity is incorporated in the 
land’s price. It also can be demonstrated that these equations are equivalent 
in steady state.10
Results for this alternative expectations formation model are quite similar 
to the naive pricing scheme, as shown in figures 12 and 13.11 Nevertheless, 
the price bubble burst depicted in figure 13 is not as string as that of figure 
7; this as a consequence of higher transitory information asymmetries in the 
naive expectations compared to the one with adaptive expectations.
Pricing schemes purposed in equations (7) and (37) are a result of non-
rational expectations. Given that under rational expectation, there is by de-
finition non-wrong pricing, there is no place for a bubble burst. This is why 
a wrong pricing scheme, like the one in equations (7) and (37), is needed in 
order to illustrate a bubble burst.
10 In steady state:
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L L+ β 2rt
L L…
11 All the other variables have a similar behavior to the one in figures 6 and 7.
Collateralized Assets Prices and Monetary Policy












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
v = 0 v = 0.5
Figure 8. Product Response with v = 0 and v = 0.5, to a 1% Decrease in ε t
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Figure 10. Interest Rate —as in (35)— Response with v = 0 and v = 0.5, to a 1% 
Decrease in ε t





















Figure 11. Interest Rate —as in (35)— Response with different Values of v, to a 1% 
Decrease in ε t
z Under Naive Expectations
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Figure 12. Impulse Response to a 1% Decrease in ε t
z  Under Naive Expectations
Mauricio Arango

























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Variable Fixed
Figure 13. Impulse Response to a 1% Decrease in ε t
z  Under Naive Expectations
Collateralized Assets Prices and Monetary Policy
Revista de Economía del Rosario. Vol. 22. No. 2. Julio-Diciembre 2019. 155-185
182
Conclusions
The model depicts an amplifying effect of credit over the rest of the economy, 
which is vastly described by the financial accelerator literature. Nevertheless, 
credit dynamic is determined by the collateral meaning of the collateral value 
and the financial system’s slackness. Taking guaranties for credit approvals 
can determine credit’s dynamic; the first factor plays a more important role 
than the second.
Under such circumstances traditional monetary policy proves highly 
inefficient in increasing economic activity, keeping the economy in a sort of 
“liquidity trap” induced by the low access to credit. As collateral determines 
the credit’s value, asset’s price used for this restriction deserves special at-
tention of economic authorities in order to have a higher control on the credit 
cycle and its power to influence the economic cycle.
The simulations show that the collaterals values can become a strong 
barrier to the hard monetary policy given that credit approvals need two 
conditions: asking for it and being worthy. Low-interest rates can make it for 
the first condition but not for the second. For that reason lowering interest 
rates in order to improve credit and, thus, house price might not be enough.
This kind of situation showed that the burst of a price bubble on assets 
used as collateral has larger consequences than let us say the .com bubble. It is 
also harder to deal with given that monetary policy effectiveness diminishes. 
This makes that the idea of “buying houses and burn them in order to reduce 
supply” does not look so unappealing, notwithstanding it is steel unavaila-
ble. Some central banks have tried buying unusual assets (for instance, the 
Bank of Japan has started to intervene in the stock market, and the feds’ qe 
programs have also lead to unusual balance sheets); nevertheless, these ac-
tions have been quite futile given that these assets are not used as collateral.
The intervention of the monetary authorities in the real estate market 
can be more distortionary than useful, that is why the attention must be in 
avoiding price bubbles, at least on assets that usually are used as collateral. 
In those cases, Greenspan’s philosophy of not doing anything and then clea-
ning the mess might not be the best idea.
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